



# American Muslim Poll

Evolving Electorate, Enduring Challenges

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Institute for  
Social Policy &  
Understanding

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## Research Team

**Saher Selod, PhD**, Director of Research, Co-Primary Investigator and Report Co-Author

**Dalia Mogahed**, Co-Primary Investigator and Report Co-Author; ISPU Scholar

**Youssef Chouhoud, PhD**, Data Analyst and Advisor; Associate Professor, Christopher Newport University

**Erum Ikramullah**, Senior Research Project Manager and Report Co-Author

**Sarah Baker**, Research Project Manager and Report Co-Author

**Sarah Goraya**, Research Intern

## Communications Team

**Katherine Coplen**, Director of Communications

**Bushra Aljaber**, Communication & Creative Media Specialist

**Raihanah Siddiq**, Communications Campaigns Specialist

## Advisory Team

**Nazita Lajevardi, PhD**, University of California, San Diego; JD, University of San Francisco; Associate Professor, Michigan State University

**Amaney Jamal, PhD**, Political Science, University of Michigan; Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics, Princeton University; Director, Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice; Director, Workshop on Arab Political Development

**Hamada Hamid Altalib, DO**, Michigan State University; Professor of Neurology and of Psychiatry, Departments of Neurology & Psychiatry, Yale School of Medicine; Department of Biostatistics, Yale School of Public Health

**Kristine Ajrouch, PhD**, Sociology, Wayne State University; Co-Director, Michigan Center for Contextual Factors in Alzheimer's Disease; Research Professor, University of Michigan Institute for Social Research

**Salman Khan, PhD**, Harvard University; MA, Stanford University; Co-Founder and Board Member, Muslim Campus Life

**Precious Rasheeda Muhammad**, Independent Scholar and Doctoral student, Departments of History and Religious Studies, Yale University; MTS Theological Studies, Islam, Arabic, Harvard University; Advisor, ISPU Working Group on Black Muslim Research

**Ihsan Bagby, PhD**, University of Michigan; Associate Professor Emeritus, University of Kansas; Advisor, ISPU Working Group on Black Muslim Research

**Su'ad Abdul Khabeer, PhD**, Princeton University; Associate Professor, Arab and Muslim American Studies, University of Michigan; Advisor, ISPU Working Group on Black Muslim Research

**Jamillah Karim, PhD**, Duke University; Advisor, ISPU Working Group on Black Muslim Research

# Table of Contents

Introduction	3
Executive Summary	4
Methodology	10
Results	12
Recommendations	43
References	44

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For more information about the study, please visit: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

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# Introduction

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After the 2024 presidential election and second inauguration of President Donald Trump, ISPU conducted our seventh American Muslim Poll, fielded by [NORC at the University of Chicago](#) between April 2, 2025, and May 8, 2025. The [genocide](#) in Gaza, as declared by the International Association of Genocide Scholars in August 2025, and the attacks on American students protesting it created a challenging new environment for American Muslims, who experienced heightened censorship and skyrocketing Islamophobia (IAGS, 2025).

As these hardships mounted, so did civic participation: Many Muslims organized to withhold their vote from then-President Joe Biden and, after his withdrawal, new nominee Vice President Kamala Harris in the election in an effort to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. There were also Muslims who disagreed with this approach and endorsed the Democratic candidate, which created tensions within Muslim communities. Meanwhile, Trump secured votes from other American Muslims. How did Muslims ultimately vote in 2024? This survey captures vote shares among the splintered electorate, along with policy priorities, satisfaction with President Trump and the direction of the country, and experiences with discrimination in both interpersonal and institutional settings.

This survey provides an update on the demographic profile of American Muslims last collected in ISPU's 2022 poll. Included in the survey is the general population as well as an oversampling of Muslims and Jews, who are underrepresented religious groups in the United States whose distinct experiences are rarely polled. As a result, our report is able to compare the responses of American Muslims to Jews, Catholics, Protestants, white Evangelicals, and individuals who are not affiliated with any religion. Furthermore, the data was further broken down by race, gender, and age.

As in past polls, survey respondents were asked a series of questions about voting and civic engagement. In this survey, participants were asked about who they voted for in 2024 as well as 2020 to identify shifts in voting preferences for American Muslims in light of Israel's actions in Gaza and the U.S. response to it, which our survey questions refer to as "the war in Gaza." Respondents were also asked about their

policy priorities when it comes to choosing a presidential candidate, as well as satisfaction with several of President Trump's policies. Their level of engagement with the political process aside from voting was also captured through a series of questions on civic engagement.

The Islamophobia Index was measured for a fifth time, enabling ISPU to provide a snapshot of where various faith and non-faith groups rank on the Islamophobia scale. We are able to assess if the war in Gaza shifted any faith group's attitudes toward Muslims. Furthermore, by repetitively surveying Americans on their attitudes toward Muslims, we are able to compare levels of Islamophobia in the U.S. over time and assess whether it is increasing or decreasing.

The report concludes with a series of recommendations identified by the researchers on addressing the important issues facing American Muslims.

# Executive Summary

## Who are American Muslims?



36%


of Muslims hold a college degree or higher

89%


of Muslims rate religion as important to their daily life

26%

of Muslims are between the ages of 18 and 24



28%  
Black



24%  
Asian



20%  
White



12%  
Arab



9%  
Hispanic

### Muslims in the United States Are Young and Diverse

Consistent with prior polls, we find that Muslims are more likely than Jews, Catholics, Protestants, white Evangelicals, the non-affiliated, and the general public to be younger; 26% of Muslims are between the ages of 18 and 24 compared to 7%–15% of the other groups. Muslims remain the most racially diverse religious group in the U.S. and the one group without a majority racial/ethnic group. Twenty-eight percent of Muslims identify as Black, 24% as Asian, 20% as white, 12% as Arab, and 9% as Hispanic.

### Muslims in the U.S. on Par with General Public in Education, Have Lower Income, and More Likely to Currently Be a Student

Consistent with prior polls, we find about one third of Muslims have a household income below \$30,000, compared to 11%–21% of other groups. Additionally, 36% of Muslims hold a college degree or higher, on par with most other groups. Given the younger age of Muslims, it follows that they are more likely than all other groups to currently be a student in a two-year, four-year, graduate, or technical program (47% of Muslims vs. 6%–15% of all other groups).

### Muslims among the Most Likely Religious Groups in the U.S. to Rate Religion as Important

Nearly 9 in 10 Muslims (89%) rate religion as important to their daily life, lower than 97% of white Evangelicals but more likely than 44% of Jews, 72% of Catholics, and 82% of Protestants. Muslims of all ages and racial/ethnic groups are equally likely to rate religion as very important. Forty-four percent of Muslims attend religious services once a week or more, more likely than 10% of Jews, 22% of Catholics, and 23% of the general public and less likely than 59% of white Evangelicals.



# *Muslim Voters in Focus:* Trends, Insights, and Growth Opportunities


## **Muslim Voter Registration Rises Steadily since 2016**

Eighty-five percent of Muslims who are legally eligible to vote in the U.S. report being registered to vote, which is less likely than 92% of Jews but on par with all other groups. Looking over time, we see a steady rise in Muslim voter registration from 60% in 2016. Despite Muslim voter registration being on par with most other groups in 2025, there is still room for growth. We find that among Muslims who are legally eligible to vote, women and non-white Muslims are least likely to be registered. Voter registration campaigns can make specific outreach to these demographics.

## **Half of Muslim Voters Cast a Ballot for Kamala Harris in 2024, Less than One Third for Trump, More than One in Ten for Stein**

Four in five Muslims registered to vote cast a ballot in the 2024 presidential election. Among Muslim voters, 50% voted for Harris, 31% for Trump, and 12% for Jill Stein. Among the general public, 50% of registered voters selected Harris, 45% selected Trump, and 0% selected Stein. Notably, among Muslim voters, men were far more likely than women to vote for Trump (42% of Muslim men vs. 17% of Muslim women). We did not find gender differences in any other group. Factors that predict voting for Trump among Muslim voters include Republican party affiliation, an income of \$75,000 or more (compared to less than \$30,000), being born in the U.S. (compared to being born outside of the U.S.), identifying as white (vs. any other race/ethnicity), and endorsing any anti-Muslim tropes (compared to not endorsing tropes).

# Muslim Votes *Shifted* between 2020 and 2024



Among Muslims who voted in the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections, 55% who voted for Biden in 2020 voted for Harris in 2024, and 82% who voted for Trump in 2020 also voted for him in 2024. Compared to the general public, Muslims were less likely to consistently vote for the Democratic candidate in both years but similarly voted Republican consistently. Our analysis reveals that 16% of Biden voters in 2020 shifted to a third-party candidate in 2024. In comparison, just 1% of Muslim Trump voters in 2020 voted third party in 2024.

### **Muslim Voters Name Family/Friends and Party Affiliation as Top Influences on Their 2024 Candidate Choice**

Slightly more than half of Muslim voters, 53%, selected family or friends as having an influence on their candidate selection for the 2024 election, followed by 49% reporting their political party affiliation having influence, and 40% who selected social media influencers. Fewer Muslim voters reported that local or religious leaders (35% for both) and national civic organizations associated with their religious group (36%) had an influence on their vote choice.

### **Muslim Voters Name Economy/Jobs, War in Gaza, and Healthcare as Top Three Policy Priorities Influencing Their 2024 Vote**

Forty-one percent of Muslims selected the economy and job creation as a top policy priority influencing their 2024 vote, followed by 35% who selected the war in Gaza and 23% who selected healthcare. The economy was also the most frequently selected policy priority for the general public at 50%, which is higher than Muslims. Just 4% of voters in the general public named the war in Gaza as a policy priority, while 18% named healthcare. For the general public, securing the border (34% of general public voters vs. 16% of Muslim voters) and preserving democracy (26% of general public voters vs. 12% of Muslim voters) were also top policy priorities. Thirty percent of Muslims who voted for Trump named the war in Gaza as a top policy priority, compared to 2% of Trump supporters in the general public. Twenty-two percent of Muslims who voted for Harris said Gaza was a top policy priority, compared to 6% of Harris voters in the general public. Seventy-eight percent of Muslims who voted third party in 2024 named Gaza as a top policy priority.

### **Muslims Report Economic Insecurity, Fear, and Stress as a Result of the 2024 Election**

Forty-four percent of Muslims report fear of economic insecurity for themselves or a member of their household as a result of the 2024 presidential election outcome, on par with most other groups. However, Muslims and Jews are more likely than all other groups to report fear for their personal safety (29% of Muslims and 23% of Jews vs. 3%–20% of other groups). We previously asked this question in 2017 about post-2016 election concerns. When comparing 2017 and 2025, we find an increase in the proportion of Muslims who report stress and anxiety enough to seek help from a mental health professional (13% in 2017 vs. 22% in 2025). At the same time, the proportion of Muslims who report fearing for their personal safety dropped from 38% in 2017 to 29% in 2025.

### **Muslim Satisfaction with the Direction of the Country and Presidential Approval Drops**

Muslim satisfaction with the direction of the country declined for the first time since 2018 with a sizable drop from 48% in 2022 to 23% in 2025. This is also a drop from the 41% who previously expressed satisfaction with the direction of the country in 2017 during President Trump's first term. Muslims are on par with the general public, Jews, Catholics, and Protestants in satisfaction with the direction of the country. About one fifth (21%) of Muslims in the U.S. approve of President Trump's job performance, which is on par with Jews (17%) and the non-affiliated (20%) but lower than Protestants (41%), Catholics (34%), white Evangelicals (63%), and the general public (32%). The 21% of Muslims who approve of the president's performance is a significant drop from the 60% who approved of Biden in 2022. Muslim men were more likely than Muslim women to approve of Trump's job performance (27% vs. 14%).

### **Muslim Civic Engagement with Elected Officials Increased since 2019**

The American Muslim Poll evaluates non-electoral civic engagement through town hall participation, campaign activity, and contact with public officials. We previously asked about engagement with local and national elected officials in 2019. In 2025, 22% of Muslims reported contacting a federal elected official, compared to 17% of the general public in 2025 and 17% of Muslims in 2019. On the other hand, 31% of the general public previously reported engaging with federal elected officials in 2019, marking a decline. Nineteen percent of Muslims and 18% of the general public contacted a local elected official in 2025. Muslims (23%) and Jews (18%) were more likely than 4%–10% of other groups to attend a town hall in the previous year. Similarly, Muslims (15%) and Jews (12%) were more likely than 3%–8% of all other groups to volunteer for a political campaign in the prior year. Nineteen percent of Muslims donated to a political campaign in the year prior, less than 30% of Jews but on par with other groups.

### **Muslims Who Voted Third Party in 2024 Aligned with Harris Voters in the General Public on Most Trump Policies**

Muslims who voted for Harris in 2024 were more likely than Harris voters in the general public to support President Trump's policies. Rather, Muslims who voted third party were more in line with Harris voters in the general public. Specifically, 1%–13% of Harris voters in the general public expressed support for the various Trump policies, in line with 2%–13% of Muslims who voted outside of the two-party candidates.

## Majority of Trump Supporters Oppose Displacement of Gazans

Fewer than half of Muslims who voted for Trump in 2024 (46%) expressed support for the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, on par with 39% of Trump voters in the general public. Trump voters in the general public, however, were more likely than Muslim Trump voters to support deporting pro-Palestinian protesters (58% vs. 45%, respectively).

## Aside from Gender Definition, Majority of Muslims Oppose Trump Policies

Slightly more than half (52%) of Muslims expressed support for defining gender as male and female, on par with 50% of the general public. Majorities of Catholics (53%), Protestants (65%), and white Evangelicals (84%) also expressed support. The majority of Muslims oppose all other Trump policies we asked about (see page 31 for full list of policies). Looking across all groups, white Evangelicals were most supportive of Trump policies, with the majority supporting all policies except the proposed forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza (31%) and proposed cuts to Medicare and Medicaid (19%). Muslim men tend to be more supportive of Trump's policies than Muslim women. Muslims and Jews show comparable levels of support for Trump-era policies, including those on Gaza, with the notable exception being support for Trump's policy on gender definitions (52% of Muslims support vs. 33% of Jews).

## Islamophobia Linked to Higher Support for Trump Policies

Among the general public, Islamophobia is a meaningful, significant predictor of all policies we asked about except for two: 1) cutting Medicare/Medicaid and 2) reducing the federal workforce. Among Muslims, Islamophobia is a significant predictor of support for all of the Trump policies we tested except 1) the recognition of only two sexes; 2) support for tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China; 3) the creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), and 4) reducing the federal workforce.



# Islamophobia *Rises* in 2025

As of May 2026, our research team has made a correction, which includes the update of three figures from the Islamophobia Index in American Muslim Poll 2025. See a full explainer on page 40.

For the fifth year, ISPU measures Islamophobia using the National Islamophobia Index. Among the general population in the U.S., the index jumped from 25 in 2022 to 33 in 2025. This jump was most pronounced among white Evangelicals (15 points), Catholics (12 points), and Jews (11 points). Protestants also rose 7 points from 23 in 2022 to 30 in 2025. Muslims' score on the Islamophobia Index remained stable with no statistically significant difference between 26 in 2022 and 21 in 2025. Nevertheless, the existence of internalized Islamophobia for Muslims is a challenge to be addressed. The non-affiliated also did not significantly change on the Islamophobia Index since 2022 (22 to 25). Looking at factors that predict Islamophobia, we find that a vote for President Trump (for the general public and Muslims) and conservative political views (for the general public) were among the strongest factors associated with higher Islamophobia scores.

## **Muslim Experience with Religious Discrimination Holds Steady, More Likely than All Other Groups**

Sixty-three percent of Muslims report facing religious discrimination in the past year, more likely than 50% of Jews and 22%–27% of other religious groups. The 63% for Muslims in 2025 is on par with previous years (2016–2022) where reports of religious discrimination ranged from 59%–62%. Muslims experience religious discrimination in both structural and social settings. Muslim men are as likely as Muslim women to report facing religious discrimination in the past year (63% of Muslim women and 64% of Muslim men).

## **Nearly Half of Muslim Families Report Children Facing Religious Bullying, Often from Adults in Authority**

Forty-seven percent of Muslim families with school-aged children report having a child who faced religious-based bullying in the past year, compared to 23% among the general public. This is on par with the 48% of Muslim families who reported bullying in 2022. When it comes to who bullied the children, 55% report another group of students, 36% report a teacher or school official, and 13% report the bullying was from a parent of a classmate.

# Methodology

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NORC at the University of Chicago fielded the 2025 American Muslim Poll, a survey developed by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), to nationally representative samples of U.S. Muslims, Jews, and the general population from April 2, 2025, through May 8, 2025. The study investigated opinions on politics, important issues facing the country, faith practices, and religious discrimination.

NORC interviewed 2,486 adults from the U.S. general population, including oversamples of 800 Muslim adults and 428 Jewish adults. These oversampled groups are weighted to match their respective proportion in the population. The survey was offered in English and Spanish and was administered in two modes depending on the preference of the respondent provided during the panel recruitment: 1) self-administered by the respondent online via the Web or 2) administered over the telephone by a live interviewer. Final data were weighted using NORC's TrueNorth Calibration methodology.

In total, NORC completed 2,430 interviews by Web and 56 by phone. NORC conducted the study on behalf of ISPU using NORC's AmeriSpeak® Panel (n=1,743), the Generation Lab panel (n=515), and Dynata for the sample source (n=172). AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel, Generation Lab has both probability and nonprobability-based panels, and Dynata is a nonprobability panel.

[AmeriSpeak](#) is the first U.S. multi-client household panel to combine the speed and cost-effectiveness of panel surveys with enhanced representativeness of the U.S. population, an industry-leading response rate, and an innovative and thorough Project Methods and Transparency Report. Since its founding by NORC at the University of Chicago in 2015, AmeriSpeak has produced more than 1000 surveys, been cited by dozens of media outlets, and become the primary survey partner of the nation's preeminent news service, the Associated Press. AmeriSpeak is the most scientifically rigorous multi-client panel available in the U.S. market.

The questionnaire was developed by ISPU in consultation with a team of advisors and the NORC project team. Prior to the field period, NORC programmed the study into their data collection platform for both

Web and phone administration (depending on the respondent's preference). Extensive checking of the programming was conducted to ensure that skip patterns and sample splits followed the design of the questionnaire.

Final data were weighted using NORC's TrueNorth Calibration methodology, as described below:

**AmeriSpeak Panel Weight:** Since the sampling frame for the probability sample is the AmeriSpeak Panel, which itself is a sample, the starting point of the weighting process for the study is the AmeriSpeak panel weight and Generation Lab base weights. The panel weight reflects the cumulative panel recruitment selection probabilities, nonresponse adjustments, and calibration to population benchmarks, both at the household and individual levels.

**Probability Base Weight:** The AmeriSpeak Panel Weight is then adjusted to account for the sample selection probability from the panel under the study sample design. The base weight for the AmeriSpeak study sample is a product of the AmeriSpeak Panel Weight and the inverse of selection probabilities associated with sample selection from the panel. The Generation Lab base weights encode their two stage sampling methodology: the simple random sample of universities whose rostered students comprise the Generation Lab higher education frame, and then a stratified random sample of Muslim students from the frame contacted for this study.

**Nonresponse Adjusted Probability Weight:** The nonresponse adjusted weight for AmeriSpeak cases is created by adjusting the base weights for respondents to compensate for nonrespondents within non-response weighting classes defined by religion, age, race/ethnicity, gender, and education. Within each weighting class, the nonresponse adjusted weight is the product of the base weight and the inverse of the weighted response rate. The nonresponse adjusted weight for Generation Lab cases is created separately and in a similar fashion, by calculating the product of base weight and inverse weighted response rate within classes defined by race/ethnicity and gender. The Generation Lab nonresponse adjusted weight is then calibrated by age and education to the reference AmeriSpeak nonresponse adjusted weight for Muslim respondents; a lambda composition formula is used that properly accounts for sample size contribution from each panel source.

The TrueNorth process solves a number of problems inherent to nonprobability samples and creates a pseudo-probabilistic and far less biased sample than nonprobability samples alone. This is mainly achieved by blending a much higher-quality and lower-bias probability sample with a nonprobability sample. But the real difference is in the sophisticated way in which TrueNorth combines these samples.

The final TrueNorth weights delivered with the data for the combined sample are developed in three major steps. First, fit a weighted tree model to the combined probability and nonprobability sample. Second, based on the fitted tree model, estimate the probabilities of inclusion in the combined probability and nonprobability sample and compute the initial weights as the inverse of the estimated probabilities. Third, poststratification adjustments, including calibration to benchmarks and weight trimming, are made to the initial weights to create the final weights. Data for the general population are benchmarked to demographic estimates from the Census, the Current Population Survey (CPS), and Pew Research Center's National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS). Data for Jewish and Muslim oversamples are benchmarked to the parameters listed in the [SSRS-fielded 2022 American Muslim Poll](#), which were themselves derived from the SSRS Omnibus and Pew estimates.

The final design effects and margin of errors are as follows:

Total:

Study design effect: 3.63

Study margin of error: +/- 4.03%

Muslim:

Study design effect: 2.89

Study margin of error: +/- 6.35%

Jewish:

Study design effect: 2.20

Study margin of error: +/- 7.57%

NORC at the University of Chicago conducts research and analysis that decision-makers trust. As a nonpartisan research organization and a pioneer in measuring and understanding the world, NORC has studied almost every aspect of the human experience and every major news event for more than eight decades. Today, NORC partners with government, corporate, and nonprofit clients around the world to provide the objectivity and expertise necessary to inform the

critical decisions facing society: [www.norc.org](http://www.norc.org).

As part of their deliverable to ISPU, NORC at the University of Chicago produced bivariate, cross-tabular tables and statistical significance testing on all measures in the survey comparing results across the following groups: Muslims, Jews, Catholics, Protestants, white Evangelicals, the non-affiliated, and the general public. NORC also produced bivariate, cross-tabular tables and significance testing among Muslims and the general public by gender, race, age, and presidential candidate choice. We also analyzed questions asked across multiple years of American Muslim Polls to assess time trends and test for statistically significant differences over time. For several topics, the ISPU research team conducted further analyses such as factor analysis, predicted probabilities, and multivariate logistic regression for deeper investigation. These are noted in the relevant sections of the report. All results we report are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level or higher, unless noted otherwise.

The full study methodology is available [here](#).



Demographic Context: *Muslims*  
Are Young, Diverse and Religious

ISPU’s body of [prior research](#) shows that Muslims in the United States are demographically diverse. Knowledge about the varied demographics and intersecting identities of Muslims is vital to understanding their behaviors and attitudes presented in this report. We therefore start with a grounding in the demographics of American Muslims.

### A Slight Majority of Muslims in the U.S. Are Men

In our survey, we employed the NORC at the University of Chicago standard gender question with response options of male or female. More than half (56%) of Muslims in the U.S. are male, compared to 44% who are female. This is on par with all other groups except the general public, which is 48% male and 52% female.

### Muslims Are the Youngest Religious Group in the U.S.

As previously reported in 2017 and 2022, American Muslims are younger than all other religious and non-religious groups. Roughly one quarter of Muslims in the U.S. (26%) are between the ages of 18 and 24. This is in comparison to 15% of Jews, 12% of Catholics, 5% of Protestants, 7% of white Evangelicals, 14% of those not affiliated with a religious group, and 10% of the general public.

### Muslims Are the Youngest Religious Group in the U.S.




Figure 1: What is your current age? (% 18–24 shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

The younger average age of American Muslims has several important implications. It means Muslims are more likely to be active in the workforce and contribute to tax revenues. Additionally, because a greater portion of the community is in their childbearing years, the population is expected to grow more rapidly than older groups with fewer births. For many young American Muslims, this also means they’ve grown up

entirely in the post-9/11 era—a time when their religious community has frequently faced scrutiny, securitization, and stereotyping. The relatively younger age of American Muslims also has implications for media consumption. The Pew Research Center finds that the highest levels of social media use are among the youngest cohorts of adults surveyed (ages 18–29) and usage decreases among older age groups (Auxier & Anderson, 2021). Given the current context around student protest crackdowns and federal inquisition of higher education institutions, Muslims between the ages of 18 and 24 who are students stand to face a direct impact to their education and careers.

### Muslims Remain the Only Religious Group in the U.S. without a Majority Racial/Ethnic Group

To collect data on race and ethnicity, we asked two questions in which respondents self-identified their racial and ethnic identities. ISPU polls about race and ethnicity in a unique way. The U.S. Census Bureau assesses race and ethnicity by first asking whether someone is of Hispanic origin and then asking them to select a racial category, with the opportunity to specify an origin within that racial category. The racial categories include white, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. Per [Census definition](#), through the 2020 Census, someone of Middle Eastern or North African origin was included under the “white” category. This will change in the 2030 Census, when a Middle Eastern or North African (MENA) category will be added.

The [Pew Research Center](#) models their assessment of race and ethnicity after the Census Bureau. ISPU follows this approach, but, given our focus on Muslims in the U.S., we also include an Arab option in our race question. This allows respondents to identify themselves as Arab if they choose, rather than lumping all Arabs with “white” like the current Census.

As previously [reported](#), of all the religious and non-religious groups we surveyed, Muslims were the only group without a majority from a single racial or ethnic background. The plurality of Muslims identify as Black or African American (28%), followed by 24% who identify as Asian, 20% who [identify as white](#), 12% who identify as Arab, and 9% who identify as Hispanic. Less than one percent of Muslims identify as [Native American or Indigenous](#).

That 20 percent of Muslims identify as white may be

shocking to some without additional understanding about the composition of this group. In a previous ISPU analysis looking at “[Who Are White Muslims?](#),” we found that two thirds were raised Muslim and 64% were born outside of the U.S., differentiating them from those who identify as white among the U.S. general public.

Additionally, Black Muslim identity is nuanced. In the current study, we find that about one quarter of Black Muslims (24%) were born outside of the U.S., compared to just 3% of Black Americans in the general public. Immigration is a central part of the U.S. Black Muslim experience, and more research is needed on the differences between immigrant and U.S.-born Black Muslims, as well as on the experiences of specific ethnic groups within this community.

The intersecting racial/ethnic identities held by Muslims play a vital role in their lived experiences as Muslims in the U.S., ranging from civic engagement to healthcare to employment and beyond. The diverse racial/ethnic makeup of Muslims in the U.S. can also impact how Muslims experience Islamophobia within specific racial/ethnic community contexts (Proctor et al., 2023; McDaniel et al., 2023; Ghaffar-Siddiqui & Steward-Streng, 2024; Steward-Streng, 2025).

### Muslims Most Ethnically Diverse Religious Group




Figure 2: Are you of Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino descent? Do you consider yourself white, Black or African American, Asian, Arab, Native American, Pacific Islander, mixed race or some other race? Base: Total Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and non-affiliated respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

### Muslims Only Religious Group without a Majority Racial/Ethnic Group




Figure 3: Are you of Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino descent? Do you consider yourself white, Black or African American, Asian, Arab, Native American, Pacific Islander, mixed race or some other race? Base: Total Muslim respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

### Muslims Most Likely Group to Be Poor

When it comes to income, 35% of Muslims have a household income of \$30,000 or less, which is more likely than 11% of Jews, 19% of Catholics, 20% of Protestants, 21% of white Evangelicals, and 20% of both the non-affiliated and the general public. On the other end of the spectrum, roughly one quarter of Muslims (24%) have a household income of \$100,000 or more, which is on par with most other groups but less likely than 48% of Jews.

### Muslims Remain Most Likely Religious Group in the U.S. to Be Poor




Figure 4: Is your household income from all sources and before taxes? (% \$30,000 or less and \$100,000 or more shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

White Muslims are more likely than Black and Arab Muslims to have a household income of \$100,000 or more (44% vs. 7% and 19%, respectively). Additionally, Asian Muslims (34%) are more likely than Black Muslims (7%) to have this level of household income.

## Muslims as Likely as Most Other Groups to Hold a Bachelor's Degree or Higher

Despite being younger, 36% of Muslims hold a bachelor's degree or higher, on par with 36% of the general public, 30% of Catholics, 37% of Protestants, and 42% of the non-affiliated. Muslims are less likely than Jews (59%) to hold a college degree or higher.

### Muslims as Likely as General Public to Hold a College Degree




Figure 5: What is the highest level of education you have completed? (% BA or higher shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims Most Likely to Be Students

At the time our poll was fielded, 47% of Muslims reported being a current student, more likely than 12% of Jews, 15% of Catholics, 6% of Protestants, 6% of white Evangelicals, 13% of the non-affiliated, and 11% of the general public. We define student as someone who is in a four-year degree program, graduate school, a two-year associate's program, or technical training. Among Muslims, 26% are in a four-year degree program, 14% are in graduate school, 4% are in a two-year associate's program, and 2% are in technical training. Given the younger age of Muslims, we would expect a higher proportion of Muslims to be current students. Among Muslims, Asian (54%), Arab (62%), white (30%), and Black Muslims (31%) are more likely than the general public (7%) to be college or graduate students. Given current national attention on [limiting freedom of speech on college campuses](#), [cuts in federal spending on higher education](#), and immigration crackdowns on international students, we are likely to see disproportionate impacts on Muslim students (Singh, 2025; American Council on Education, 2025).

## Half of Muslims Are Students, More Likely than All Other Groups




Figure 6: Are you currently a student? (% Net yes shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims More Likely than Most Other Groups to Be Employed

Seven in 10 Muslims are employed (70%), which is more likely than 57% of Protestants, 52% of white Evangelicals, and 61% of the general population. Muslims are as likely as Jews (67%), Catholics (65%), and the non-affiliated (63%) to be employed. Eight percent of Muslims are self-employed, on par with 6%–11% of all other groups. For employed Americans across the U.S., as well as those seeking employment, a reduction in the federal workforce and federal funding, in addition to the employment impacts of AI, loom large. Given the younger age of Muslims in the U.S., it is expected that they are least likely to be retired (6% of Muslims vs. 10%–30% of all other groups).

### Muslims among the Most Likely to Be Employed




Figure 7: Current employment status. (% Net employed shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims More Likely than Most Other Groups to Rate Religion as Important to Daily Life

Muslims (89%) say religion is important to their daily life, more likely than 44% of Jews, 72% of Catholics, and 82% of Protestants. At 97%, only white Evangelicals surpass Muslims in rating religion as important to daily life. Muslim men and women are equally likely to say religion is important to their daily life (89% of Muslim men and 90% of Muslim women).

## Muslims More Likely than Most Other Groups to Rate Religion as Important to Daily Life




Figure 8: How important is your religion to your daily life? (% Net important shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslim Men and Women Equally Likely to Rate Religion as Important




Figure 9: How important is your religion to your daily life? (% Net important shown). Base: Total Muslim respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Young Muslims Continue to Be as Likely as Older Muslims to Rate Religion as Very Important

As found in all prior American Muslim Polls, Muslims of all ages are equally likely to rate religion as very important to daily life. This includes 61% of 18-to-29-year-olds, 62% of 30-to-49-year-olds, and 70% of Muslims ages 50+. On the other hand, among the general public, rating religion as very important differs by age, with older people being the most likely (17% of 18-to-29-year-olds, 29% of 30-to-49-year-olds, and 43% of those 50+).

## Muslims of All Ages Equally Likely to Rate Religion as Very Important




Figure 10: How important is your religion to your daily life? (% Very important shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims of Different Racial/Ethnic Groups Equally Likely to Rate Religion as Very Important

Nearly three quarters, 73%, of Arab Muslims rate religion as very important, which is on par with 57% of white Muslims, 66% of Black Muslims, and 60% of Asian Muslims. White Muslims are more likely than their racial counterparts in the general public (33%) to say that religion is very important to their daily lives.

## Racial/Ethnic Groups among Muslims Equally Likely to Rate Religion as Very Important




Figure 11: How important is your religion to your daily life? (% Very important shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Nearly Half of Muslims Attend Religious Services Once a Week or More

Forty-four percent of Muslims report attending religious services once a week or more, which is more likely than Jews (10%), Catholics (22%), and 23% of the general public. At 59%, white Evangelicals are the most likely to attend religious services once a week or more. Muslims (17%) and white Evangelicals (22%) attend religious services more than once a week. Muslim men are more likely than Muslim women to attend religious services once a week or more (55% vs. 31%, respectively). Muslims of all ages are equally likely to attend religious services once a week or more (43% of 18-to-19-year-olds, 46% of 30-to-49-year-olds, and 43% of Muslims ages 50 and older). Additionally, Muslims of all age groups are more likely than their age counterparts in the general public to attend religious services once a week or more. Specifically 43% of Muslims ages 18–29 vs. 12% of those 18–29 in the general public, 46% of Muslims ages 30–49 vs. 21% of those 30–49 in the general public, and 43% of Muslims ages 50 and older vs. 30% of those 50+ in the general public.

## Muslims among the Most Likely to Attend Religious Services Once a Week or More




Figure 12: Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? (% Net once a week or more shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims of All Ages Equally Likely to Attend Religious Services Once a Week or More




Figure 13: Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? (% Net once a week or more shown). Base: Total Muslim respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)



Muslim Voters: Growing  
Civic Engagement

American Muslims are engaging more with the electoral process. Muslim voter registration has been steadily increasing. Efforts by Muslim civic organizations in the 2020 presidential election, like Emgage’s Million Muslim Votes [campaign](#), reflect the efforts made over the last decade to improve voter turnout of American Muslims.

### Growing Muslim Voter Registration Puts Them on Par with All Other Groups Except Jews

American Muslims are the least likely group to be legally eligible to vote (79%) compared to 90% of the general public and 95% of Jewish voters. They are, however, on par with almost all other groups, including the general public, in voter registration among legally eligible voters. Voter eligibility among Muslims in 2025 (79%) has dropped slightly since 2017, when it was at 86%. In 2025, Muslims ages 50+ (91%) are more likely than 18-to-29-year-old Muslims (75%) to be legally eligible to vote in the U.S. White (82%), Black (86%), and Arab Muslims (80%) are more likely to be legally eligible to vote than Asian Muslims (61%). Among the general public, Hispanics (82%) are less likely than white (95%) and Black Americans (96%) to be legally eligible to vote.

Overall, Muslim voter registration among legally eligible voters is equivalent to most other religious groups in the U.S., with 85% of Muslims who are legally eligible to vote being registered to vote, which is less than 92% of Jews and on par with all other groups (87% of Catholics, 83% of Protestants, 87% of white Evangelicals, and 84% of both the non-affiliated and the general public).

### Muslims as Likely as Most Other Groups to Be Registered to Vote




Figure 14: Are you registered to vote at your present address or not? (% Yes shown) Based: Total respondents who are legally eligible to vote, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

### Among Muslims Who Are Legally Eligible to Vote, Women and Non-White Muslims Are Least Likely to Be Registered

Among Muslims who are legally eligible to vote, 92% of men are registered to vote, which is more likely than 76% of Muslim women. We previously identified Muslim women as a population of interest for GOTV efforts. Similarly, Catholic men (93%) and men in the general public (87%) are more likely than Catholic women (81%) and women in the general public (81%) to be registered to vote.

When it comes to race and ethnicity, among Muslims who are legally eligible to vote, white Muslims (96%) are more likely than Asian Muslims (82%) to be registered to vote. White voters (86%) in the general population are more likely to be registered to vote compared to Latino voters (75%) but are on par with other racial and ethnic groups.

### Muslim Voter Registration on Steady Rise since 2016

Though voter registration has seen a steady increase among Muslims between 2016 and 2020 (60% in 2016, 68% in 2017, 75% in 2018, and 78% in 2020), the percent of legally eligible Muslims registered in 2022 and 2025 are statistically on par with each other (81% and 85%, respectively); however, overall, between 2016 and 2025, the proportion of Muslims registered to vote did increase from 60% to 85%.

### More Muslims Are Registered to Vote than in 2016




Figure 15: Are you registered to vote at your present address or not? (% Yes shown) Base: Total Muslim respondents who are legally eligible to vote in 2016–2020, 2022, and 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

**Age, Income, and Mosque Attendance Are Predictors of Voter Participation More Broadly**

We used multivariate logistic regression to examine predictors of voting in the 2024 presidential election among Muslims and the general public (controlling for age, income, gender, education, and other covariates). Among Muslims, political party affiliation, political ideology, and contacting elected officials did not affect one’s likelihood to vote. Instead, demographic and religious variables were the strongest predictors of voter turnout. Specifically among Muslims, those ages 60 and older (compared to 18-to-29-year-olds), those earning \$75,000 or more (compared to those earning less than \$30,000), those who are white (vs. non-white Muslims), those who are American born (compared to

those born outside the U.S.), those who attend the mosque weekly (vs. those who attend less frequently), and those who expressed any Islamophobia (compared to those who expressed none) were significantly more likely to have voted in 2024.

Among the general public, those earning \$30,000 or more (compared to those earning less than \$30,000), those ages 45 and older (compared to 18-to-29-year-olds), and those who contacted a local elected official (compared to those who did not) were significantly more likely to have voted in 2024. Any expressed Islamophobia, political party affiliation, political ideology, and religiosity were not significant predictors of voter turnout for the general public.

# Factors That Predict Voter Participation in the 2024 Presidential Election among Muslims

**Significant predictors** of having voted in the presidential election among Muslims:

- Ages 60+ (vs. Ages 18-29)
- Household Income > \$75,000/Year (vs. < \$30,000/Year)
- White Race (vs. Non-White)
- American-Born (vs. Foreign-Born)
- Weekly Religious Attendance (vs. Less Frequent Attendance)
- Any Expressed Islamophobia (vs. None)



- Variables we tested but that made **no difference** on the likelihood of voting in the presidential election:
- Political Party Affiliation
  - Political Ideology
  - Education
  - Gender
  - Importance of Religion
  - Contacted a Federal Official
  - Contacted a Local Official

**Figure 16:** Did you vote in the 2024 presidential election? Base: Total Muslim respondents, 2025. We used linear regression to test a battery of variables to determine which were linked to higher or lower likelihood of voting in the 2024 presidential election. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## How Muslims Voted in 2024

### Among Registered Voters, Muslims and the Non-Affiliated Were Least Likely to Cast a Ballot in the November 2024 Election

Of those registered to vote, 80% of Muslims voted in the 2024 election. This is significantly less than 91% of registered voters who voted among the general public, 94% among Jews, 92% among Catholics, and 95% among Protestants and white Evangelicals.

### Half of Muslim Voters Selected Kamala Harris for President in 2024

Muslim voters were in the spotlight during the 2024 election. Even though they are a small percentage of the total U.S. population, there are enough Muslims to determine presidential elections in key [swing states](#) (for example, in 2020 when the presidential election came down a few thousand votes). Exit polling by some organizations [showed](#) a large percentage of Muslims voted for Jill Stein in 2024, and media [articles highlighted](#) that many Muslim voters who had previously voted Democrat did not continue this course in the 2024 election.

Our survey shows that 50% of Muslims (similar to the general public) voted for Kamala Harris, more than Protestants (39%) and white Evangelicals (14%) but less than Jews (70%) and those who are religiously unaffiliated (74%).

Thirty-one percent of Muslims in the survey voted for Trump, less than Catholics (50%), Protestants (57%), white Evangelicals (82%), and the general public (45%) but on par with Jews and the religiously non-affiliated.

Jill Stein's highest support was by far among Muslims (12%) compared to 1% or less of other groups in 2024 and compared to 2020 when Stein received less than 1% of the Muslim vote. Only 3% of Muslims who were registered to vote cast a ballot in 2024 but did not vote for a presidential candidate.

## Half of Muslims Voted for Kamala Harris in 2024, Similar to the General Public




Figure 17: Who did you vote for? (% Voted for shown) Base: Total respondents who voted in the November 2024 election. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

### Unlike Women in Other Religious Groups, Muslim Women Stand Apart from Their Male Counterparts on Trump

Muslim men were far more likely than Muslim women to vote for Donald Trump (42% vs. 17%), but both were equally likely to have voted for the other candidates. Among the other groups, there were no gender differences when it came to presidential candidate selection.

## Muslim Women Less Likely than Muslim Men to Vote for Trump in 2024




Figure 18: Who did you vote for? (% Voted for Donald Trump shown) Base: Total respondents who voted in the November 2024 election. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

Broken down by race and ethnicity, the majority of Black Muslims (76%) voted for Harris and the plurality of white Muslims (49%) voted for Trump. Asian Muslims (22%) were the highest represented group who voted for Jill Stein, although 50% voted for Harris. Only white voters from the general public had a majority of Trump voters (53%), while the majority of Black Americans (90%) and plurality of Latinos (49%) voted for Harris. Arab Muslim voters were too small a sample to report.

## Nearly Half of White Muslims Voted for Trump in 2024




Figure 19: Who did you vote for? Base: Total respondents who voted in the November 2024 election. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)  
\*Sample size too small to report on Arab Muslims

### Predictors of Trump Supporters

We used a regression analysis to identify the factors that influenced supporting Trump in the 2024 election. We conducted this analysis separately for Muslims, Jews, and the general public. Being or leaning Republican (vs. all other political affiliations) is a significant predictor of voting for Trump among Muslims, Jews, and the general population. Holding somewhat or very conservative political views (vs. moderate or liberal views) predicts a vote for Trump among the general population. A high household income (\$75,000 or more vs. \$30,000 or less) predicts a vote for Trump for Muslims and Jews. For Muslims, being born in the U.S. (vs. being foreign born) is associated with a greater likelihood of voting for Trump. Older age for the general public and Jews (ages 45 and older for the general public and ages 30 and older for Jews vs. 18-to-29-year-olds for both groups) predicts voting for Trump but not for Muslims. Race, specifically being white, for the general public and Muslims, is associated with greater likelihood of voting for Trump. Among Jews, weekly religious attendance is a predictor for voting for Trump, but not for the general public or Muslims. For the general public, being a college graduate (compared to lower levels of education) is associated with a lower likelihood of voting for Trump.

Any expressed Islamophobia based on ISPU’s Islamophobia Index (discussed in more detail later in this report) predicts voting for Trump for Muslims and the general public but not for Jews. This means that, for Muslims and the general public, agreeing with any of the false Islamophobic tropes we ask about makes one more likely to vote for Trump.

## Obstacles to Voting

### Muslims Remain the Most Likely Religious/Non-Religious Group to Report Facing Obstacles to Voting

The 2022 American Muslim Poll identified that even though voter turnout for American Muslims is increasing, Muslims still encounter obstacles to voting. In 2024, this trend continued. At 37%, Muslims are the most likely faith/non-faith group to experience obstacles to voting, compared to 4%–16% of other groups. Long wait times to cast a ballot was the most often cited obstacle faced by Muslims (16%), followed by intimidation by private citizens (14%), two experiences that were reported less often by the general public (6% and 2% respectively). White Muslims (54%) reported they were the most likely to experience obstacles to voting followed by Black Muslims (36%) and Asian Muslims (29%). White Muslims were more likely to say they experienced intimidation by private citizens (21%) compared to the general public (2%), followed by Black Muslims and Asian Muslims (both at 9%). Among the general public, it was Hispanic voters who were the most likely racial/ethnic group to experience voting obstacles.

### Muslims Most Likely to Report Facing Obstacles to Voting in the 2024 Election




Figure 20: Please indicate which of the following obstacles, if any, you experienced when trying to cast your ballot in the 2024 election (% any obstacles shown) Base: Total respondents who voted in the 2024 election. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

# Muslim Votes Shift

## Comparing the 2024 Vote Choice vs. 2020 Vote Choice

Muslims have shifted over the last few decades in terms of party affiliation. Prior to 9/11 in the 2000 presidential election, the majority of South Asian and Arab Muslims voted Republican while African American Muslims voted Democrat; however, due to American foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased levels of discrimination initially institutionalized against Muslims under Republican administrations via counterterrorism policies, Muslims began to flock to Democratic candidates (Jalalzai, 2009). And while the majority of Muslims voted Democrat in 2020, the genocide in Gaza and increased scrutiny of Muslims in schools and workplaces has interrupted this trend.

Among the general public, 79% of those who voted for Joe Biden in 2020 reported voting for Kamala Harris in 2024. Similarly, 81% of those among the general public who voted for Trump in 2020 reported voting for him in 2024. For the general public, just 2% of those who voted for Biden in 2020 voted for someone else besides Harris or Trump in 2024, while 1% of those who voted Trump in 2020 reported voting for someone else besides Harris or Trump in the 2024 presidential election. Among Muslims, however, only 55% of those who voted for Biden in 2020 reported voting for Harris in 2024, while 82% of Muslims who voted for Trump in 2020 reported voting for him in 2024. This shows a drop in Muslim votes for the Democratic candidate between the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections.

Further analysis reveals how these 2020 Democratic voters shifted in 2024. A small percentage of Muslim voters appear to have shifted between the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates over the last few elections. Ten percent of Muslims who voted for Biden in 2020 reported voting for Trump in 2024. Sixteen percent of Muslims who voted for Biden in 2020 reported voting for a third-party candidate or some other candidate besides Harris or Trump in 2024, and 19% did not vote for president in 2024. On the other hand, just 1% of Muslims who voted for Trump in 2020 reported voting for someone else besides Harris or Trump in 2024.

## What Did Biden’s 2020 Muslim Voters Do in 2024?




Figure 23: Who did you vote for? If you voted in the 2020 presidential election, who did you vote for? Base: Total Muslim respondents who are legally eligible to vote in 2020 and 2024. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## What Did Trump’s 2020 Muslim Voters Do in 2024?




Figure 23: Who did you vote for? If you voted in the 2020 presidential election, who did you vote for? Base: Total Muslim respondents who are legally eligible to vote in 2020 and 2024. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## How Did Muslims Who Voted for Someone Else in 2020 Vote in 2024?




Figure 23: Who did you vote for? If you voted in the 2020 presidential election, who did you vote for? Base: Total Muslim respondents who are legally eligible to vote in 2020 and 2024. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Influences on 2024 Presidential Candidate Choice

In the 2025 American Muslim Poll, ISPU surveyed voters on what factors influenced their presidential candidate preference. With the rise of newer social media platforms, such as TikTok [since 2021](#), it is important to reassess what influences American Muslim voters and their choices.

### Family/Friends and Political Party Affiliation Were the Most Salient Factors Influencing Muslims' Presidential Candidate Choices in 2024

The most important factors that influenced American Muslims' vote choices were family and friends (53%), political party affiliation (49%), and social media influencers (40%). The top influences for Jewish voters and the general public were political party affiliation (36% and 33%, respectively), family and friends (23% for both), and mainstream media (16% and 17%, respectively). Muslim voters were more likely to have their presidential candidate vote influenced by local religious congregations and national religious leaders (35% for both) as well as national civic organizations associated with their religious group (36%) compared to all other groups and the general public (ranging from 6% to 19% on all three items).

### Muslims Report Economy/Job Creation and the War in Gaza as the Most Important Policy Priorities That Influenced Presidential Candidate Choice

The 2024 presidential election was a unique year for Muslim voters. Muslim voters organized around the war in Gaza, from state and national campaigns such as the Listen to Michigan campaign, [uncommitted movement](#), and [Never Biden](#) campaign to local phone-banking efforts aimed at state and federal representatives. These efforts reflected how a significant share of Muslims coalesced around a single issue, the war in Gaza, unifying many of them in ways that had not been seen previously among American Muslim voters. In 2024, the economy and jobs (41%) and the war in Gaza (35%) were the most salient issues in terms of presidential candidate choice for American Muslims. While these were the top two issues, Muslim policy priorities overall still do not match a clean partisan profile. Muslims care about Democrat-aligned issues, like climate change and healthcare, as much as Jews and those who are not religiously affiliated but are less

likely to name preserving democracy (12%) as a top priority compared to Jews (37%), Catholics (25%), and those who are non-affiliated (39%).

Muslims (41%) are less likely than the general public (50%), Protestants (52%), and white Evangelicals (56%) to name the economy/job creation as a policy priority. They were more likely to name the war in Gaza as a priority (35%), compared to 10% of Jews and all other groups including the general public (3%–4%). Just 3% of Muslims identified preserving traditional values concerning gender and marriage as a top policy priority, on par with 1%–5% of most other groups but less than white Evangelicals (20%) and Protestants (10%).

### Muslims Cite Economy, War in Gaza, and Healthcare as Top Policy Priorities For 2024 Election




Figure 24: What are the three most important policy priorities on which you judged the presidential candidates in the election last November? (% Top five priorities named by Muslims and general public shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

### Muslims More Likely to Rank the War in Gaza as a Policy Priority For 2024 Election Compared to Other Religious Groups




Figure 25: What are the three most important policy priorities on which you judged the presidential candidates in the election last November? (% "Economy and Job Creation," "War in Gaza," "Preserving Democracy," and "Securing the Border" shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

## Among Muslims, Women, Asians, and Young People More Likely to Name Gaza as a Top Policy Priority in the 2024 Election

Muslim women (41%) were more likely than Muslim men (30%) to list the war in Gaza as their top issue. For Muslims ages 18–29 (47%) and 30–49 (37%), the war in Gaza was the most important policy issue by which to judge their presidential candidate, while 55% of Muslims ages 50+ rated the economy and job creation as the most important policy. This reflects a difference in policy priorities based on age for Muslim voters. When it comes to race and ethnicity, Asian Muslims (59%) ranked the war in Gaza as their top policy issue, while white (37%) and Black Muslims (53%) ranked the economy and job creation as their top issue. For white Muslim voters, the war in Gaza (32%) was their second most important issue, and for Black Muslim voters, healthcare (33%) was the second most important policy issue. Twelve percent of Black Muslim voters cited the war in Gaza as a policy priority in the 2024 presidential election. Arab Muslims were too small a sample to report.

## Asian Muslims More Likely than White and Black Muslims to Report War in Gaza as a Top Policy Priority in the 2024 Election




Figure 27: What are the three most important policy priorities on which you judged the presidential candidates in the election last November? (% "Economy and Job Creation," "War in Gaza," "Healthcare" shown) Base: Total Muslim respondents who voted in the 2024 election, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

\*Sample size too small to report on Arab Muslims

## Among Muslims, Women, Younger People More Likely to Cite Gaza as a Top Policy Priority in the 2024 Election




Figure 26: What are the three most important policy priorities on which you judged the presidential candidates in the election last November? (% "Economy and Job Creation," "War in Gaza," "Healthcare" shown) Base: Total Muslim respondents who voted in the 2024 election, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Policy Priorities Based on 2024 Candidate Preference

Among those in the general public who voted for Trump in the 2024 election, the top three policy priorities were securing the border (63%), the economy (59%), and immigration reform (21%). For Harris supporters in the general public, the top policy priorities were preserving democracy (43%), the economy (43%), and healthcare (28%). The economy was the only shared top policy priority for Harris and Trump voters.

On the other hand, for Muslim Trump supporters, the top three policy priorities were the economy (32%), the war in Gaza (30%), and taxes (27%). For Muslim Harris supporters, the top three policy priorities were the economy (49%), healthcare (29%), and the war in Gaza (22%). For Muslims who voted third party or for another candidate, the top policy priorities were the war in Gaza (78%), the economy (34%), and keeping the U.S. out of foreign wars (20%). Thus, the war in Gaza is a shared top policy priority across Harris, Trump, and third-party Muslim voters. At the same time, Muslims who voted for a third-party candidate were far more likely to have named Gaza as a policy priority driving their vote, helping to explain why 16% of the Muslims who voted for Biden in 2020 shifted to a third-party candidate in 2024.

### Muslim and General Public 2024 Harris Voters' Policy Priorities




Figure 28: What are the three most important policy priorities on which you judged the presidential candidates in the election last November? (% insert shown) Base: Total Muslim and general public respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

### Muslim and General Public 2024 Trump Voters' Policy Priorities




Figure 29: What are the three most important policy priorities on which you judged the presidential candidates in the election last November? (% insert shown) Base: Total Muslim and general public respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

### Muslim Third-Party Voters Overwhelmingly Choose Gaza as Most Important Policy Priority




Figure 30: What are the three most important policy priorities on which you judged the presidential candidates in the election last November? (% insert shown) Base: Total Muslim and general public respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

# Impact of 2024 Presidential Election

## Fear of Economic Insecurity Tops Post-Trump Election Impact among All Groups

Among all groups, the most frequently cited impact of the 2024 presidential election is fear of economic insecurity for oneself or a member of their household.

For Muslims, 44% report a fear of economic insecurity for themselves or a member of their household as a result of the outcome of the 2024 presidential election, on par with 45% of Jews, 40% of Catholics, and 51% of the non-affiliated but more likely than 27% of Protestants and 14% of white Evangelicals.

## Fear of Economic Insecurity Most Commonly Reported Post-Election 2024 Concern

	Muslim	Jewish	Catholic	Protestant	White Evangelical	Non-Affiliated	General Public
Fear of Economic Insecurity for yourself or a member of your household	44%	45%	40%	27%	14%	51%	37%
Suffered emotionally with stress and anxiety	22%	18%	12%	12%	3%	16%	13%
Feared for your personal safety or that of your family from white supremacist groups	29%	23%	8%	7%	3%	20%	12%
Fear of AI taking away your job	19%	10%	10%	8%	6%	10%	9%
Made plans to leave the country, if it becomes necessary	20%	15%	5%	5%	1%	12%	8%
Fear related to your immigration status or that of someone in your household	22%	2%	6%	3%	1%	8%	5%
Joined, donated to, or volunteered at a civic organization for the first time	9%	8%	2%	2%	1%	7%	4%
Decreased or decided against donating to an organization associated with your faith community	9%	4%	1%	2%	3%	2%	2%
Modified your appearance to be less identifiable as a member of your religious community	14%	5%	0%	2%	0%	2%	2%
Removed your children from public schools in favor of religious-based schools or homeschooling	4%	1%	2%	1%	3%	2%	2%

**Figure 31:** Now switching back to the most recent election, as a result of the outcome of the 2024 presidential election have you done or experienced any of the following? Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims Most Likely Group to Fear for Their Personal Safety as a Result of the Outcome of the 2024 Presidential Election

Muslims (29%) are more likely than Catholics (8%), Protestants (7%), white Evangelicals (3%), the non-affiliated (20%), and the general public (12%) to fear for their personal safety. Nearly a quarter of Jews (23%) reported fearing for their personal safety, on par with Muslims. Muslim women (36%) are more likely to fear for their personal safety than Muslim men (24%). Muslims ages 18–29 rated fear for their family members' personal safety from white supremacists (39% and fear related to their immigration status (31%) more highly than Muslims ages 30–49 (25% and 18%, respectively) and 50+ (21% and 11%, respectively).

## Muslims and Jews More Likely than All Other Groups to Cite Fear for Personal Safety as a Result of 2024 Election




Figure 32: Now switching back to the most recent election, as a result of the outcome of the 2024 presidential election have you done or experienced any of the following? (% "Feared for your personal safety or that of your family from white supremacist groups" shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

Fourteen percent of Muslims modified their appearance to be less visible as Muslims, Muslim men and women equally likely to do so (17% and 11%, respectively). Muslims are also the group most likely to fear due to their immigration status (22%) compared to other groups (1%–6%). Asian Muslims (43%) were the most likely to fear for their immigration status compared to white Muslims (14%), Black Muslims (18%), and Arab Muslims (18%). For the general public, Hispanics (13%) were more likely to fear for their immigration status compared to white (2%) and Black Americans (3%).

**Compared to 2016 Election, Muslims More Stressed after 2024**

Between 2017 and 2025, the proportion of Muslims who suffered emotionally with stress and anxiety enough to believe they needed services from a mental health professional almost doubled, rising from 13% in 2017 to 22% in 2025.

Though Muslims and Jews are more likely to report fear for their personal safety from white supremacists than all other faith or non-faith groups, for Muslims the 2025 result (29%) is actually a drop from 2017 (38%). There was also a significant drop in the percentage of Muslims who engaged with civic organizations for the

first time as a result of the presidential election (from 18% in 2017 to 9% in 2025).

The proportion of Muslims who experienced the following as a result of the prior year’s presidential election did not differ between 2017 and 2025: made plans to leave the country if necessary (18% in 2017 and 20% in 2025), modified their appearance to be less identifiable as a member of their religious community (15% in 2017 and 14% in 2025), decreased donations to organizations associated with their faith community (8% in 2017 and 9% in 2025), and removed their children from public school (5% in 2017 and 4% in 2025).

## Muslims Reporting Emotional Distress as a Result of Presidential Election Outcome Nearly Doubled in 2025 Compared to 2017

	Muslim		General Public	
	2017	2025	2017	2025
Suffered emotionally with stress and anxiety	13%	22%	7%	13%
Feared for your personal safety or that of your family from white supremacist groups	38%	29%	13%	12%
Joined, donated to, or volunteered at a civic organization for the first time	18%	9%	12%	4%
Made plans to leave the country, if necessary	18%	20%	8%	8%
Modified your appearance to be less identifiable as a member of your religious community	15%	14%	1%	2%
Decreased or decided against donating to an organization associated with your faith community	8%	9%	4%	2%
Removed your children from public schools	5%	4%	1%	2%

**Figure 33:** Now switching back to the most recent election, as a result of the outcome of the 2024 presidential election have you done or experienced any of the following? Base: Total respondents, 2017 and 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

# Muslim Satisfaction and Presidential Approval Drop

## Muslim Satisfaction with the Direction of the Country Has Dropped since 2022

For the first time since 2018, satisfaction with the country’s direction among American Muslims has declined, falling from 48% in 2022 to 23% in 2025. This satisfaction is also significantly lower than in 2017 (41%) when Trump was also in office and campaigned on overtly anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Despite the decline, American Muslims remain more satisfied with the country’s direction than the religiously unaffiliated (12%) but less than white Evangelicals (38%). The portion of Muslims who are satisfied with the direction of the country is on par with the general public (24%), Jews (17%), Catholics (28%), and Protestants (30%) at a 95% confidence interval used throughout the report.

## Muslim Satisfaction with the Direction of the Country Declined since 2022




Figure 34: Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today? (% Satisfied shown) Base: Total Muslim respondents in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims as Likely as Most Others to Report Satisfaction with the Direction of the Country




Figure 35: Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today? (% Satisfied shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Satisfaction with the Direction of the Country Varies by Gender, Age, and Race

In 2025, notable gender differences emerged in satisfaction with the country’s direction. Among Muslims, men were significantly more likely than women to express satisfaction (30% vs. 14%). This pattern held across other groups as well, including Protestants (36% of men vs. 24% of women), white Evangelicals (51% of men vs. 27% of women), and the general public (28% of men vs. 20% of women).

Consistent with previous years, Muslims ages 30–49 were most likely to be satisfied with the country’s direction in 2025. Thirty-six percent of 30-to-49-year-old Muslims expressed satisfaction, compared to 14% of 18-to-29-year-olds and 15% of Muslims ages 50 and older. In contrast, among the general public, those ages 50 and older were more likely to express satisfaction with the country’s direction in 2025 than those ages 30–49 (27% vs. 18%).

In 2025, white Muslims were most likely to express satisfaction with the country’s direction at 44%, scoring higher than all other Muslim ethnic groups: Black Muslims at 18%, Arab Muslims at 22%, and Asian Muslims at 11%.

## American Muslims Are Less Likely than the General Public and Other Groups to Approve of Donald Trump’s Job Performance

In 2025, about one fifth (21%) of American Muslims approved of the way Donald Trump handled his job as president. This was on par with Jews (17%) and the non-affiliated (20%) but lower than Protestants (41%), Catholics (34%), white Evangelicals (63%), and the general public (32%).

## Muslims Less Likely than Most Other Groups to Approve of Donald Trump




Figure 36: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president? (% Approve shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

### Among Muslims, Men, 30-to-49-Year-Olds, and Those Who Identify as White Are More Likely to Approve of President Trump

Among Muslims, men were significantly more likely (27%) than women (14%) to approve of President Trump. Age also played a factor in approval of President Trump. Among Muslims, those ages 30–49 were most likely to approve (33%), compared to younger Muslims ages 18–29 (15%) and older Muslims ages 50 and older (9%).

White Muslims expressed the highest approval rating for President Trump among all racial groups, with 41% expressing approval. This was significantly higher than Black Muslims (20%), Arab Muslims (16%), and Asian Muslims (8%). In the general public, 41% of white Americans expressed approval, compared to 25% of Hispanic Americans and 7% of Black Americans.

### American Muslim Presidential Approval Drops since 2022

Following the same trend seen in the satisfaction with the direction of the country, Muslim presidential approval dropped sharply in 2025 compared to 2022 (21% for Trump in 2025 vs. 60% for Biden in 2022). This pattern was consistent among Jews, with approval falling from 58% in 2022 to 17% in 2025, and among the general public, from 42% in 2022 to 32% in 2025.

## Muslim Approval of the President’s Job Has Declined Sharply since 2022




Figure 37: Do you approve or disapprove of the way [Barack Obama / Donald Trump / Joe Biden] is handling his job as president? (% Approve shown) Base: Total Muslim respondents in 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Civic Engagement beyond Voting

Civic engagement beyond voting is assessed by the American Muslim Poll through town hall attendance, volunteering for a political campaign, contributing money to a political campaign, and contacting federal and local officials.

### Muslim Engagement with Elected Officials Grows

Muslim were more civically engaged than most other groups in 2025. Muslims (22%) were less likely than Jews (31%) but more likely than the general public (17%) to contact their federal elected representative. Muslims who voted for Trump (51%) were more likely to contact a federal official than those who voted for Harris (26%) or some other candidate (27%), which was the opposite for the general public, with those who voted for Harris (26%) being more likely to contact a federal official compared to those who voted for Trump (18%).

Muslims (19%) were less likely than Jews (30%) to contact a local official but on par with Catholics (14%), Protestants (22%), white Evangelicals (19%), the non-affiliated (15%), and the general public (18%). White Muslims were more likely to contact their local elected officials compared to Black Muslims (28% vs. 13%, respectively). Muslims who voted for Trump (46%) were more likely to contact a local official than those who voted for Harris (23%). Among the general public, Trump and Harris voters were equally likely to have contacted their local elected officials (21% and 25%, respectively).

## Muslims More Likely than Most Other Groups to Engage with Federally Elected Officials




Figure 38: Have you met or communicated by email, phone, or mail with your federal elected congressional representative or their staff within the last year? Have you met or communicated by email, phone, or mail with your local elected congressional representative or their staff within the last year? (% Yes shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslim Engagement with Federally Elected Officials Grows, While General Public Engagement Declines




Figure 39: Have you met or communicated by email, phone, or mail with your federal elected congressional representative or their staff within the last year? (% Yes shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025 and 2019. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims and Jews among the Most Civically Engaged

Muslims were the most likely to attend a town hall (23%) compared to Catholics (10%), Protestants (7%), white Evangelicals (4%), the non-affiliated (7%), and the general public (8%) but on par with Jews (18%).

Fifteen percent of Muslims reported volunteering for a political campaign in the year prior to the survey, more likely than 8% of Catholics, 6% of Protestants, 3% of white Evangelicals, 6% of the non-affiliated, and 7% of the general public but on par with Jews (12%).

Muslims (19%) were less likely to contribute to a political campaign compared to Jews (30%), who are the most likely of all groups, including the general public (15%), to have contributed to a political campaign in the last year. Muslim men were more likely to contribute

than Muslim women (24% of Muslim men vs. 11% of Muslim women). White and Black Muslims were generally more likely to attend a town hall, volunteer, and contribute to a political campaign compared to Asian and Arab Muslims. Thirty-nine percent of white Muslims and 29% of Black Muslims attended a town hall, compared to 12% of Asian Muslims and 7% of Arab Muslims. Roughly one quarter of white Muslims (27%) volunteered for a political campaign, more likely than 5% of Asian and 12% of Arab Muslims. Sixteen percent of Black Muslims volunteered for a political campaign, which is more likely than Asian Muslims. Nearly one third of white Muslims (32%) and one quarter of Black Muslims (25%) contributed money to a political campaign, more likely than 9% of Asian and 8% of Arab Muslims.

## Muslim Civic Engagement Remains the Same between 2020 and 2025




Figure 40: Which of the following actions have you taken in the past 12 months? (contributed money to a political campaign, attended a town hall meeting, volunteered for a political campaign) (% Yes shown) Base: Total Muslim respondents, 2020 and 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslim Trump Voters Participated in Greater Number of Civic Engagement Activities

Among Muslims, Trump voters have a higher average number of the five civic engagement activities surveyed compared to Harris voters and those who voted for someone else (2.39 vs. 1.25 vs. 0.75), while among the general public, Harris voters have a higher average number of civic engagement activities than Trump voters (0.98 vs. 0.67).

## Support for Trump Policies

Our survey was fielded April 2–May 8, 2025, three months into President Trump’s second term in office and amid a flurry of proposed and implemented [executive orders](#). We asked the following question to assess the public’s views on several Trump polices:

Rate your level of support for the following policies of the Trump administration:

- To recognize two sexes, male and female
- Termination of federal “diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility” (DEI) mandates, policies, programs, and activities in the federal government
- The proposed forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza
- Expansion of immigration enforcement, detention, and deportations by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- The deportation of students who participated in protests against the war in Gaza
- Tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China
- The proposed cutting of Medicare and Medicaid
- The creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)
- Reducing the federal workforce by eliminating jobs

### Only a Minority of Muslims Support Trump Policies, with the Exception of Gender Definition

The majority of Muslims oppose all the Trump policies we asked about with the exception of defining gender as male and female, where more than half (52%) support it, as do the majority of Catholics (53%), Protestants (65%), and white Evangelicals (84%). In fact, the recognition of two sexes was the most supported Trump policy among the general public, with half (50%) expressing support. On the other hand, one third of Jews (33%) and 28% of the non-affiliated expressed support for this policy. A plurality of Muslims (48%) oppose the creation of DOGE, while only 23% support it.

Looking now at the wider public, when it comes to other policies of the Trump administration, only a minority of the American general population supports his most high-profile policies. This includes the expansion

of ICE (42%); the termination of DEI in the federal government (34%); the creation of DOGE (30%); tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China (29%); and reducing the federal workforce by eliminating jobs (28%). The three policies we asked about that garnered the least support among the general public were the deportation of students for protesting against the war in Gaza (24%), the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza (17%), and proposed cuts to Medicare and Medicaid (10%).

Overall, white Evangelicals are the most likely group to support President Trump’s policies. The majority of white Evangelicals supported all of the policies except for two notable exceptions: the proposed forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza (31%) and proposed cuts to Medicare and Medicaid (19%).

On the other side of the spectrum, Jews are the least likely to support any of the Trump policies we asked about, with no policy garnering more than a minority of Jewish support.

## Most Trump Policies Supported by Less than Half of Americans

	Muslim	Jewish	Catholic	Protestant	White Evangelical	Non-Affiliated	General Public
Deportation of students who participated in protests against the war in Gaza	14%	26%	27%	32%	50%	10%	24%
Proposed cutting of Medicare and Medicaid	14%	6%	10%	14%	19%	4%	10%
Reduction of the federal workforce by eliminating jobs	16%	21%	23%	42%	63%	13%	28%
Proposed forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza	14%	21%	16%	22%	31%	9%	17%
Tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China	18%	14%	29%	43%	61%	12%	29%
Termination of federal DEI mandates, policies, programs, and activities in the federal government	22%	22%	33%	47%	62%	18%	34%
Creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)	23%	18%	30%	42%	60%	14%	30%
Expansion of immigration enforcement, detention, and deportations by DHS and ICE	26%	29%	41%	55%	78%	25%	42%
Recognition of two sexes, male and female	52%	33%	53%	65%	84%	28%	50%

**Figure 41:** Rate your level of support for the following policies of the Trump administration (% Net support shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Jewish and General Public Support for Muslim Ban Falls since 2018, Holds Steady among Muslims

In 2018, during President Trump’s first term in office, we asked about the level of support for the so-called “Muslim ban.” We asked the same question in the 2025 American Muslim Poll. Support for the “Muslim ban” declined between 2018 and 2025 among Jewish communities, from 24% of Jews expressing support in 2018 to 15% in 2025. Similarly, there was a decline in support for the “Muslim ban” among the general public, with 28% expressing support in 2018 and 20% expressing support in 2025.

In 2025, the majority of Muslims and Jews oppose a “Muslim ban” (71% and 61%, respectively) as does 43% of the general public. Muslims (14%) are as likely as the Jews (15%) and the general public (20%) to support the “Muslim ban.” Compared to 2018 when 13% of Muslims said they supported this policy, Muslims are statistically as likely (14%) to say the same in 2025. Banning people from majority Muslim countries, which President Trump put into law during his first term in a variety of forms (Amnesty International UK, 2025), remains a part of his overall policy platform today in a [modified](#) form (Treisman, 2025). This policy has lost support among the American public, at least in its original conceptualization.

## Support for “Muslim Ban” Wanes among Jews and the General Public since 2018, Holds Steady among Muslims





Figure 42: Would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose a ban on visas to Muslims wanting to enter the United States? (% Net support shown) Base: Total respondents, 2018 and 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

## Muslim Men Tend to Be More Supportive of Trump’s Policies than Muslim Women

Across the board, Muslim men are more likely than Muslim women to support the battery of Trump policies included in this survey. The largest gender gap is in men’s (32%) and women’s (12%) support for the creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). Two policies share the smallest gap: the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and the proposed cutting of Medicare and Medicaid, with both having 18% of men and 9% of women supporting the policies. This gender gap is also reflected in the presidential vote where, among Muslims who participated in the vote, 42% of Muslim men and 17% of Muslim women cast their vote for Trump.

# Muslim Men More Likely than Muslim Women to Support Trump Policies



**Figure 43:** Rate your level of support for the following policies of the Trump administration (% Net support shown). Base: Total Muslim respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

This gender pattern is not unique to Muslims, though it is most pronounced among Muslims. For example, Jewish men (43%) are more likely than Jewish women (21%) to support recognizing two sexes, the expansion of ICE (36% of men, 21% of women), termination of DEI (28% vs. 14%), and reducing the federal work force (28% vs. 14%). For the remaining policies, Jewish men and women are on par, including the minority support for the forced displacement of Palestinians (21% for both), and deportation of student protesters for Palestine (26% vs. 25%).

The gender difference across policies holds for Protestants, Catholics, white Evangelicals, and the general population. Trump enjoys the most support among white Evangelicals, but even in this group, men are more likely than women to support termination of DEI (73% vs. 52%), the creation of DOGE (73% vs. 48%), reducing the federal workforce (75% vs. 53%), and the deportation of students for pro-Palestinian protests (61% vs. 39%).

Notably, the only group in which there is no statistical gender difference at all in support for Trump policies is non-affiliated Americans. Men and women are equally likely to support all policies tested, and support never surpasses 29% on any policy, making this group the least supportive of the platform of any tested.

### **Muslims and Jews Equally Likely to Oppose Displacement of Palestinians in Gaza and Deportation of Students for Anti-War Protests**

Muslims and Jews are roughly similar in their level of support for Trump policies, including issues regarding Gaza, where the two are on par. The stark exception is regarding gender definitions where Muslims (52%) exceed Jews (33%) in their support. The majority of Jews (52%) oppose recognizing two sexes, on par with 48% of the non-affiliated and more likely than 18% of Muslims, 24% of Catholics, 16% of Protestants, and 6% of white Evangelicals.

The majority of Muslims and Jews *oppose* Trump policies aimed at squashing pro-Palestinian activism and rights, including the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza (63% of Muslims and 52% of Jews oppose) and the deportation of students for pro-Palestinian speech and protests (64% of Muslims and 61% of Jews oppose). Additionally, 55% of those not affiliated with a religious group oppose the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, and 61% oppose the deportation of students who participated in protests against the war in Gaza.

Only 14% of Muslims support the deportation of students for pro-Palestinian speech and proposed displacement of Palestinians in Gaza, which is less than Jews (26% and 21% support each of these policies, respectively). Catholics (27%), Protestants (32%), white Evangelicals (50%), and the general public (24%) are all more likely than Muslims to support the deportation of students who protest the war in Gaza. At 31%, white Evangelicals are also the most likely to support the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, compared to 14% of Muslims, 16% of Catholics, 22% of Protestants, and 17% of the general public. The group least likely to support these policies are not Muslims (10%) but those not affiliated with a religious group (9%).

### **Majority of Trump Supporters in the General Public Oppose the Displacement of Gazans, on Par with Muslim Trump Voters**

We now look at levels of support and opposition to President Trump's policies by candidate selection in the 2024 presidential election. Are President Trump's policies overwhelmingly favored by those who voted for him? Is there any support among those who did not vote for him?

When it comes to the two anti-Palestinian policies, Trump voters in the general public (39%) and Muslim Trump voters (46%) are on par with their level of support for the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. Trump voters in the general public are more likely than their Muslim counterparts to support deporting students for pro-Palestinian protests (58% and 45%, respectively). Those in the general public who voted for Kamala Harris (2%) are far less likely to support the forced displacement of Gazans than Muslims who voted for Harris (13%). A [July 2025 Gallup poll](#) found that only 8% of Democrats support Israel's military actions in Gaza, compared to 71% of Republicans and 25% of Independents. Prior to that, a [Gallup poll from March 2025](#) found that, for the first time ever since tracking, Democrats are more likely to express sympathies for Palestinians (49%) than Israelis (38%).

Looking across policies, we find that Trump supporters in the general public are more likely than their Muslim counterparts to support all his policies, with the exception of one. Muslim Trump supporters are more likely than Trump supporters in the general public to support the proposed cutting of Medicare and Medicaid (44% vs. 21%, respectively).

### **When It Comes to Policies Related to Palestine, Muslims Who Voted Third Party Trend with Harris Voters in the General Public**

Digging deeper, we find that Muslim Harris voters are far more likely than their counterparts in the general public to support all of Trump's policies, including the least popular ones like cutting Medicare and Medicaid (9% vs. 1%, respectively) and the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza (13% vs. 2%, respectively).

Rather, we found that Muslims who voted for a third-party candidate, namely Jill Stein, are more in line with Harris voters in the general public when it comes to support for President Trump's policies. Specifically,

1%–13% of Harris voters in the general public express support for the various Trump policies, in line with 2%–13% of Muslims who voted outside of the two-party candidates. A notable exception was President Trump’s policy to recognize only two sexes, male and

female, with 18% of general public Harris voters supporting it compared to 57% of Muslims who voted third party, although the difference was not statistically significant.

## Trump Supporters, Oppose the Displacement of Gazans

Support	General Public 2024 Vote				Muslim 2024 Vote			
	Kamala Harris	Donald Trump	Other	Did Not Vote	Kamala Harris	Donald Trump	Other	Did Not Vote
Deportation of students who participated in protests against the war in Gaza	4%	58%	11%	13%	15%	45%	2%	6%
Proposed cutting of Medicare and Medicaid	1%	21%	3%	8%	9%	44%	5%	11%
Reduction of the federal workforce by eliminating jobs	4%	65%	26%	22%	11%	44%	7%	12%
Proposed forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza	2%	39%	3%	13%	13%	46%	2%	14%
Tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China	3%	70%	30%	26%	14%	45%	7%	23%
Termination of federal 'DEI mandates, policies, programs, and activities in the federal government	7%	75%	28%	26%	18%	56%	6%	17%
Creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)	3%	71%	32%	23%	17%	49%	9%	20%
Expansion of immigration enforcement, detention, and deportations by DHS and ICE	13%	86%	43%	26%	29%	50%	13%	22%
Recognition of two sexes, male and female	18%	90%	60%	55%	34%	66%	57%	57%

**Figure 44:** Rate your level of support for the following policies of the Trump administration (% Net support shown). Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

The image features an abstract graphic design at the top. It consists of several overlapping, rounded shapes. A large, dark blue shape dominates the right side and bottom. On the left, there is a bright orange shape that overlaps with a dark blue shape. The overall composition is clean and modern, with a focus on geometric forms and a limited color palette of blue and orange.

# Islamophobia and Discrimination

## Islamophobia Index

This year, 2025, marks the fifth year of [ISPU's National Islamophobia Index](#), previously measured in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022. The Islamophobia Index is a measure of the level of public endorsement of five false, negative stereotypes associated with Muslims in America. These are the items used to construct the index:

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements, where 1 means you strongly disagree and 5 means you strongly agree in regard to most Muslims living in the United States.

1. Most Muslims living in the United States are more prone to violence than other people.
2. Most Muslims living in the United States discriminate against women.
3. Most Muslims living in the United States are hostile to the United States.
4. Most Muslims living in the United States are less civilized than other people.
5. Most Muslims living in the United States are partially responsible for acts of violence carried out by other Muslims.

ISPU analysts chose these five variables based on previous research linking these perceptions with greater tolerance for anti-Muslim policies such as mosque surveillance, racial profiling, and greater scrutiny of Muslims at airports, the so-called Muslim ban, and even taking away voting rights from Americans who are Muslims (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Bruneau et al., 2018; Kteily et al., 2016). These five measures are not meant to cover the totality of public Islamophobia, which can and does include many other false beliefs about Muslims. They are instead meant to offer an evidence-based measure of five perceptions known to be linked to acceptance of discriminatory policies.

Answers to this battery of questions were used to construct an additive scale that measures overall anti-Muslim sentiment. The scale is standardized to range from 0 to 100. The resulting Islamophobia Index provides a single metric that is easy to understand, compare, and track over time. The Islamophobia Index measures the endorsement of anti-Muslim stereotypes (violent, misogynist), perceptions of Muslim aggression toward the U.S., degree of Muslim

dehumanization (less civilized), and perceptions of Muslim collective blame (partially responsible for violence), all of which have been shown to predict public support for discriminatory policies toward Muslims.

It is noteworthy that this index, while called simply the "Islamophobia Index," only measures anti-Muslim sentiment among the public and not the degree to which Islamophobia is institutionalized by the state. Islamophobia is not simply a phenomenon of societal sentiment but also a structural phenomenon, manifesting in legislation, budget decisions, and law enforcement practices at the local, state, and federal levels. While our index does not measure structural Islamophobia, public tolerance for many of these practices is linked to higher scores on the Islamophobia Index.

### **A note on the 2025 Islamophobia Index:**

*As of May 2026, our research team has made a correction, which includes the update of three figures from the Islamophobia Index in American Muslim Poll 2025.*

*The scores initially reported for Jews (19) and Muslims (19) were the cumulative score across five years (2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2025), rather than the 2025 scores alone. The correct 2025 Islamophobia Index scores are 28 for Jews and 21 for Muslims.*

*Due to a separate internal error that occurred during the transition to a new polling vendor in 2025, the non-affiliated score for 2025 was misreported. The correct score for the non-affiliated is 25, not 23.*


*No other findings in American Muslim Poll 2025 were affected, and the report has been updated to reflect these corrections. Accuracy and transparency are central to our mission, and we are committed to upholding both.*

*The updated results follow a troubling upward trend between 2022 and 2025 that applies to the general public and most other religious groups surveyed. This rise takes place amidst escalating anti-Muslim rhetoric since October 2023 and through contentious national and local elections where Islamophobic tropes have become far too common. The need to dismantle Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate remains immediate and urgent. We offer the following [recommendations](#).*

## Islamophobia Rises in 2025 Compared to Previous Years

The Islamophobia Index, which measures the degree to which people endorse anti-Muslim stereotypes, has risen sharply in 2025 compared to previous years. Among the general population in the U.S., the index jumped from 25 in 2022 to 33 in 2025. This jump was most pronounced among white Evangelicals (15 points) and Catholics (12 points). Jews had an Islamophobia score of 17 in 2022, the lowest of any group that year, which increased only slightly to 19 in 2025, on par with Muslims (19). Protestants also rose 7 points from 23 in 2022 to 30 in 2025. Muslims decreased on the Islamophobia Index from 26 in 2022 to 19 in 2025. The only group that did not change since 2022 were the non-affiliated (22 to 23).

### Islamophobia Index Rises in 2025



## Islamophobia in the General Public

### Islamophobia Rises Even among Young People in the General Public

Even among young people in the general public, ages 18–29, there was a marked increase in Islamophobia between 2022 and 2025, from 24 to 31, an 8 point increase. Between 2018 and 2022, Islamophobia Index scores for 18-to-29-year-olds in the general public ranged from 21 to 24.

## Sharpest Increases in Islamophobia Are among White and Hispanic Americans in the General Public

The Islamophobia Index rose from 2022 to 2025 most sharply among white (24 to 35) and Hispanic Americans (25 to 34) in the general public. Black Americans' Islamophobia Index score stayed fairly stable with only a slight rise from 26 in 2022 to 29 in 2025.

### Islamophobia Rises for White and Hispanic Americans in the General Public, Remains Stable for Black Americans




Figure 46: Scores on ISPU's Islamophobia Index. Base: General public respondents, 2022 and 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Islamophobia among Muslims

While some may find the existence of Islamophobia among Muslims shocking, it is in line with our prior research showing that Muslims experience [internalized Islamophobia](#) by endorsing false negative stereotypes about Muslims as measured by the Islamophobia Index (Mogahed et al., 2022; Mogahed et al., 2020; Ikramullah, 2019; Mogahed & Chouhoud, 2018). Readers can refer to this prior research for a deeper understanding of internalized Islamophobia, including its predictors and the role of media.

### White Muslims Score Highest on Islamophobia

Among Muslims, there is a wide range of perceptions regarding Islamophobic ideas. Muslims who identify as white are the most likely to endorse false Islamophobic tropes, scoring a 31 on the Islamophobia Index, lower than white (35) and Hispanic Americans (34) in the general public but higher than Black Americans (29) in the general public. Notably, white Muslims are also far more likely than non-white Muslims to have voted for

President Trump. A plurality of white Muslims (49%) voted for Trump, compared to 14% of Asian Muslims and 21% of Black Muslims. Sample sizes of Arab and Hispanic Muslim voters are too small to report on. Black Muslims score a 24 on the Islamophobia Index, lower than Black (29), white (35), and Hispanic Americans (34) in the general public. By far the lowest Islamophobia Index scores are among Asian (12) and Arab Americans (8), revealing a fracture in the Muslim community regarding the very nature of the U.S. faith group, requiring more research, community conversations, and healing.

## Islamophobia and Presidential Candidate Choice in 2024

### Trump Voters, Including Muslims, Significantly Higher on the Islamophobia Index

Muslims who voted for Trump in the 2024 presidential election have a higher Islamophobia Index score than many other groups, including the general public. While Trump voters in the general public have an Islamophobia Index score of 46, his supporters in the Muslim community are not far behind with a score of 43 on this measure of endorsement of anti-Muslim stereotypes.

Likewise, Muslim Harris voters scored a 21 on the Islamophobia Index, surpassing their counterparts in the general public who scored 19. Muslims who voted for Jill Stein have the lowest Islamophobia score of 5. This pattern suggests that, for Muslims, support for either of the main candidates comes with a degree of buy-in for an Islamophobic narrative, even more so than is present in the general public among their partisan peers.

## Predictors of Islamophobia

### Trump Vote and Conservative Views Strongest Predictors of Islamophobia

To better understand which factors are associated with higher levels of Islamophobia, we ran a linear regression analysis testing how a battery of variables predict higher Islamophobia Index scores. Overwhelmingly, we find that a vote for Trump in 2024 and conservative political views were stronger predictors of higher Islamophobia Index scores than age, race, or income in the general public and among Muslims.

## Variables Impacting Islamophobia Index

	General Public	Muslim
<b>Predicts Higher Islamophobia</b>		
Vote for Trump	↑	↑
Conservative	↑	No Impact
Ages 45-59	No Impact	↑
Born in the U.S.	No Impact	↑
<b>Predicts Lower Islamophobia</b>		
High Income (\$75K+)	↓	No Impact
Female	No Impact	↓
Ages 60+	No Impact	↓
No Impact: Race, education, religiosity		

Figure 47: Results based on linear regression analysis to identify factors associated with Islamophobia Index scores. Models control for the following demographic factors: political party identification, political views, income, education, nativity, education, age, sex, and race. Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2-May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

### A Trump Vote Predicts Higher Islamophobia

Among the general public, identifying as somewhat or very conservative closely mirrors a Trump vote in predicting Islamophobia, where a general public respondent is 13% more likely to endorse anti-Muslim tropes if they identify as a conservative. Political ideology has no impact on a Muslim's perception of anti-Muslim tropes however, but a vote cast for Trump makes a Muslim 18% more likely to endorse anti-Muslim tropes.

### Higher Income Predicts Lower Islamophobia

Among the general public, those with high income (\$75,000+) are 12% less likely to score high on the Islamophobia Index. Income has no impact on Muslim Islamophobia Index scores.

### Age, Gender, and Nativity Are Significantly Linked to Levels of Islamophobia

Muslims between 45 and 59 years of age (20%) and those born in the U.S. (10%) were more likely to score high on the Islamophobia Index, while women were less likely to adopt Islamophobic tropes. These factors have no impact on Islamophobia among the

general public.

### **Religiosity Has No Impact on Islamophobic Perceptions for the General Public**

Religious devotion has no impact on Islamophobia in the general public. This suggests that for the general public, political ideology and not religious differences—even strongly held ones—drive anti-Muslim prejudice. Religious devotion had no impact on the Islamophobia score for Muslims. For Muslims it suggests that Islamophobia is not driven by low religious devotion but rather age, nativism, and their support of Trump.

## **Islamophobia and Support for Trump Policies**

### **Higher Islamophobia Index Score Linked to Higher Support for Trump Policies**

As [previously reported](#), endorsing the false tropes about Muslims in the U.S. that comprise ISPU's [National American Islamophobia Index](#) is linked to support for policies that are prejudicial to American Muslims as well as anti-democratic measures such as suspending the right to free speech in the wake of a terrorist attack. In prior years, we've examined associations between Islamophobia Index scores and voter participation and support for coalition building on a number of issues. Here we do the same. The next section will provide more information about the creation of the Islamophobia Index and an analysis of Islamophobia in 2025.

This year, we tested a number of high-profile policies championed by the Trump administration, some popular with the public and others opposed by the majority, to assess to what extent, if at all, endorsing Islamophobic tropes predicted support for these policies. Specifically, we looked at the probability of support for each policy as a function of Islamophobia, while controlling for standard demographic factors including political party identification, political views, income, education, nativity, age, sex, and race.

The values in Table 48 below are the average marginal effects of Islamophobia on support for each Trump policy and represent the percent increase in likelihood of support for each policy comparing the highest and

lowest levels of Islamophobia, while controlling for demographic factors. The results of this analysis are as follows.

Among the general public, Islamophobia is a meaningful, significant predictor of all policies we asked about, except for two: 1) cutting Medicare/Medicaid and 2) reducing the federal workforce. On the other hand, endorsing at least one of the five anti-Muslim tropes is a predictor of support for the “Muslim ban,” with those with the highest levels of Islamophobia being 19% more likely, on average, to support this policy, higher than any other policy tested. The next policy whose support is most impacted by Islamophobia is the expansion of immigration enforcement and the recognition of two sexes. Members of the general public with the highest levels of Islamophobia are 15% more likely to support expansion of ICE and upholding the gender binary than those with the lowest Islamophobia.

Similarly, among Muslims, Islamophobia is a significant predictor of support for all of the Trump policies we tested except 1) the recognition of only two sexes; 2) support for tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China; 3) the creation of the Department of Government Efficiency; and 4) reducing the federal workforce. Like the general public, the most impacted policy is support for the “Muslim ban,” with Muslims who agree with any of five anti-Muslim tropes being 19% more likely to support. Muslims who endorse at least one anti-Muslim trope are 17%–18% more likely than those who do not support any Islamophobic tropes to support the other policies (see Figure 41).

Endorsing Islamophobic ideas is a powerful predictor of support for both domestic policies that impact all Americans as well as policies that disproportionately impact Muslims, such as deporting pro-Palestinian student protesters, the so-called “Muslim ban,” and the displacement of Palestinians in Gaza. This link between public Islamophobia and support for policies opposed by most Americans highlights how Islamophobia harms not just Muslims but society at large.

## Higher Islamophobia Index Linked to Higher Support for Trump Policies

Support	General Public	Muslim	Support	General Public	Muslim
The Muslim Ban	.19	.19	Tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China	.13	.11
Expansion of immigration enforcement, detention, and deportations by DHS and ICE	.15	.17	Termination of federal DEI mandates, enforcement, policies, programs, and activities in the federal government	.13	.11
Deportation of students who participated in protests against the war in Gaza	.13	.14	Creation of the Department of Government Efficiency	.11	.09
Proposed forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza	.13	.13	Reducing the federal workforce by eliminating jobs	.07	.12
Recognition of two sexes, male and female	.15	-.02	Proposed cutting of Medicare and Medicaid	.04	.18


**Figure 48:** Result of predicted probability analysis testing average marginal effect of Islamophobia on support for Trump policies controlling for the following demographic factors: political party identification, political views, income, education, nativity, education, age, sex, and race. Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Religious Discrimination and Religious-Based Bullying

### Muslims Most Likely to Experience Religious Discrimination

In 2025, Muslims are the most likely religious group to report having experienced religious discrimination in the prior year (63%), more so than Jews (50%), Catholics (25%), Protestants (27%), white Evangelicals (26%), and the non-affiliated (22%). Muslim men and women are equally likely to report facing religious discrimination (63% and 64%, respectively).

### Muslims Most Likely to Experience Religious Discrimination



**Figure 49:** How often, if at all, have you personally experienced discrimination in the past year because of your religion? (% Net any discrimination shown) Base: Total respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Proportion of Muslims Who Experience Religious Discrimination Unmoved since 2016

The portion of Muslims who experience discrimination based on their religion has held fairly steady since 2016. In 2016, when ISPU first fielded the American Muslim Poll, 60% of Muslims reported facing religious discrimination. In subsequent years, from 2017 to 2022, the proportion ranged from 60% to 62%. The lack of statistically significant differences in the proportion of Muslims reporting religious discrimination across these years suggests that who is in the White House does not impact the social and structural bias in the everyday lives of Muslims.

## Frequency of Religious Discrimination Faced by Muslims Unchanged since 2016




Figure 50: How often, if at all, have you personally experienced discrimination in the past year because of your religion? (%Net any discrimination shown) Base: Total Muslims respondents, 2016–2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Muslims Most Likely to Face Religious Discrimination on Both Social and Structural Level

To those who responded that they faced any religious discrimination in the past year, we asked a series of follow-up questions asking if they faced religious discrimination in various settings. For the purpose of the following analysis, we categorized the following settings as social discrimination:

- At your place of work when interacting with peers
- At your university/college/academic institution when interacting with your peers

We categorize these other settings as structural discrimination:

- When applying for a job
- When buying/leasing a home/condo/apartment
- At the airport
- When interacting with law enforcement
- When interacting with immigration officers/officials
- When receiving healthcare services, such as a medical or dental appointment, mental health services, or hospital
- On social media from social media platform companies (Facebook, X, etc.)
- When interacting and/or conducting transactions with a U.S. banking/financial institution
- At your university/college/academic institution when interacting with people in authority
- At your place of work when interacting with people in authority

Sample sizes for Catholics, white Evangelicals, and the non-affiliated who ever experienced religious discrimination were too small to report, so they are excluded from the analysis.

## Social Discrimination

Among those who reported having faced religious-based discrimination in the past year, Muslims (28%) were on par with other religious groups to have experienced it from peers at work, including Protestants (23%) and Jews (20%). Muslims (25%) were also more likely than any other group who reported facing religious discrimination to have experienced it at their university when interacting with peers, more than twice as likely as Jews (13%) and Protestants (6%).


## Structural Discrimination

Among those who reported facing religious discrimination across religious and non-religious groups, social media from social media platform companies (such as having posts removed or accounts closed) topped the list as the most likely context studied where respondents experienced it. Among Muslims who experienced religious discrimination, almost half (49%) reported experiencing discrimination on social media from social media platform companies. Among those who experienced discrimination, 46% of Jews and 24% of Protestants reported religious

discrimination from social media companies on their platforms, the highest of any context measured, with Jews on par with Muslims and Protestants less likely than Muslims to have had this occur. Airports follow social media platforms as the most frequent settings where Muslims experience religious discrimination (37%), and uniquely so, as no more than 6% of all other groups studied reported the same.

Among Muslims who experienced discrimination, 20%–29% experienced it in the following settings,

all representing structural bias: when applying for a job (28%), when interacting with immigration officials (29%), at their place of employment when interacting with people in authority (26%), at their university when interacting with people in authority (24%), when interacting with law enforcement (26%), when receiving healthcare (23%), when buying or leasing a home (20%), and when banking (20%). In almost all cases, Muslims are more likely than any group studied to report discrimination in these spaces.



## The Role of Gender, Age, and Race in Religious Discrimination

### Gender

Though Muslim men (63%) and women (64%) are statistically equally likely to report having experienced some frequency of religious discrimination in the past year, in some situations, men are more likely than women to report discrimination. These include the following situations:

- When applying for a job (34% of Muslim men vs. 21% of Muslim women)
- When interacting and/or conducting transactions with a U.S. banking/financial institution (26% of Muslim men vs. 13% of Muslim women)

This is a departure from previous years when Muslim women were more likely overall to report discrimination (68% of women vs. 55% of men in 2019).

Notably, Muslim men and women are on par when it comes to experiencing discrimination, except for these two structural issues. For example, Muslim men and women who experienced discrimination are equally likely (26% and 30%, respectively) to say it occurred when interacting with peers at work and when interacting with people in authority at work (30% for men and 20% for women). This suggests that Muslim men and women are equally likely to experience religious bias overall, with the exception of a few instances of structural racism. Muslim men have historically been seen as more of a threat than Muslim women by the state and other institutions, perhaps reflecting the [popular stereotypes](#) depicting Muslim men as violent and Muslim women as victims (Mishra, 2007). This may explain these cases of increased experiences with structural discrimination. This is also supported by our previous finding that the most agreed-upon false trope about Muslims in the U.S. is that most Muslims in the U.S. discriminate against women (Mogahed et al., 2022). It may also reflect the fact that Muslim men may do more banking and are more likely to apply for a job since they are more likely to be employed outside the home (77% of Muslim men vs. 61% of Muslim women).

### Age

Young Muslims ages 18–29 (73%) are more likely to report experiencing some frequency of religious discrimination than older Muslims (58% of those ages 30–49 and 56% of those ages 50 and older).

### Race

Asian (73%) and Arab Muslims (70%) are as likely to report religious discrimination as white Muslims (66%). The only significant difference in experience with religious discrimination is between Asian Muslims and Black Muslims (73% vs. 55%).

Since October 7, 2023, many scholars, activists, and academics have noted the distinction between Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism. It is therefore important to note that anti-Palestinian racism is unique, although there are some crossovers with Islamophobia. According to a 2022 report by the [Arab Canadian Lawyers Association](#), anti-Palestinian racism “silences, excludes, erases, stereotypes, defames, or dehumanizes Palestinians or their narratives” (Majid, 2022). According to the [Institute for the Understanding of Anti-Palestinian Racism](#), this includes “justifying violence against Palestinians” and “erasing the human rights and equal dignity and worth of Palestinians.” Thus, while the dehumanization of Palestinians may include anti-Muslim tropes, this type of racism differs from Islamophobia in that it is focused on a Palestinian identity.

## Muslims of All Racial/Ethnic Backgrounds Statistically on Par When It Comes to Experiencing Religious Discrimination




Figure 52: How often, if at all, have you personally experienced discrimination in the past year because of your religion? (% Net any discrimination shown). Base: Total Muslim respondents, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](#)

## Nearly half of Muslim Families Report Children Bullied for Religion

Nearly half (47%) of Muslims with children in grades K-12 report their child or children were bullied for their religious identity in the past year. This far exceeds the 23% of families with K-12 children among the general public who reported facing religious-based bullying in the past year. For Muslim families, reports of religious-based bullying have held steady since 2017.

## Nearly Half of Muslim Families with Children Who Have Been Bullied for Their Religion Say an Adult Was the Bully

As a follow-up to whether or not a child has faced religious-based bullying, we asked participants to identify who bullied their child. Participants could select more than one response and we differentiated between online versus in-person bullying (though these we grouped together in our analysis). For the first time, we included “parent of a classmate” as a response option. More than half (55%) said the bully was another student. Additionally, 49% named an adult as the bully, including 36% who said it was a teacher or other school official and 13% who reported the bully was a parent of a classmate. When we first asked the question in 2017, we did not differentiate between online and in-person bullying. In 2017, a quarter (25%) of parents with kids who were bullied reported that the source of the bullying was a teacher or school official; 86% of parents said the bullying was from another student. The bullying of Muslim children, especially from adults, should sound an alarm for better teacher and school administration training and accountability as well as the need to equip parents with the right tools to advocate for their children.

## About Half of Muslim Families Have a Child Bullied for Their Religion, More Likely than Any Other Group




Figure 53: How often, if at all, have your children experienced bullying, such as insults or physical assaults in the past year because of their religion at school? (% Net experienced any bullying shown) Base: Total Muslim respondents with children in grades K-12, 2017, 2020, 2022, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

## Nearly Half of Bullying Cases Involve Adults




Figure 54: Who has bullied your child? (mark all that apply) Base: Total Muslim respondents with children who experienced religious-based bullying in the past year, 2025. Fielded April 2–May 8, 2025. More: [ispu.org/poll](https://ispu.org/poll)

# Recommendations

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Based on the findings from this survey, we offer the following recommendations to stakeholders to address some of the challenges American Muslim communities face.

## Supporting Muslim Civic Engagement

- Voter registration campaigns and messaging should prioritize outreach to Muslim women and young people, who were less likely to have voted in the 2024 election and are less likely to be registered to vote. Additionally, specific outreach like “Get Out the Vote” campaigns are needed to reach Muslims who are registered to vote to ensure they cast a ballot. We found that of Muslims who are registered to vote, 80% voted in the 2024 election, less likely than most other groups.
- Muslim voters are not a monolithic bloc, and their support should not be taken for granted by any party. Candidates and elected officials should engage in genuine outreach to understand the issues that shape Muslim political choices. The significant shifts observed in the 2024 presidential election demonstrate that a significant portion of Muslims are issue-driven, rather than strictly partisan voters. For example, the war in Gaza mobilized large segments of the community, yet was often dismissed, downplayed, or ignored by both major political parties.
- Many Muslims continue to face obstacles to voting. Civic organizations and local election officials should understand the key obstacles reported by Muslim voters, and address them as part of broader efforts to ensure equitable access to the ballot box.
- Muslim voters would benefit from more training on how to effectively engage with elected officials at both the local and federal levels—such as attending town halls and contributing to campaigns—to sustain growth and improve the impact of their civic engagement efforts.

## Continue to Combat Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate

- Internalized Islamophobia among Muslims remains a concern. More qualitative research is needed to understand its extent and underlying causes so that relevant stakeholders can respond effectively.
- Expand interfaith efforts to include genuine engagement and cooperation across religious and non-religious groups, particularly in addressing policies such as those targeting Palestinians.
- Combatting Islamophobia must remain a priority at both social and structural levels, requiring sustained investment from leaders across all sectors.
- Islamophobia continues to drive bullying of Muslim students in K-12 schools. Educators and school leaders must better understand how discrimination by peers and authority figures affects Muslim students and take concrete steps to address it.
- Education to counter Islamophobia in K-12 settings should involve the entire school community, including administrators and parents of students, and not just teachers and students.

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# Institute for Social Policy & Understanding

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## RESEARCH MAKING AN IMPACT

### About the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU)

ISPU provides objective research and education about American Muslims to support well-informed dialogue and decision-making. Since 2002, ISPU has been at the forefront of discovering trends and opportunities that impact American Muslim communities. Our research aims to educate the general public and enable community change agents, the media, and policymakers to make evidence-based decisions. In addition to building in-house capacity, ISPU has assembled leading experts across multiple disciplines, building a solid reputation as a trusted source for information for and about American Muslims.

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Institute for Social Policy and Understanding  
info@ISPU.org

**Mailing address:**

3200 Greenfield Rd, Suite 300  
Dearborn, MI 48120  
(800) 920-4778

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